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Abstract. The evolution and maintenance of cooperation fascinated researchers for several 
decades. Recently, theoretical models and experimental evidence show that costly 
punishment may facilitate cooperation in human societies, but may not be used by winners. 
The puzzle how the costly punishment behaviour evolves can be solved under voluntary 
participation. Could the punishers emerge if participation is compulsory? Is the 
punishment inevitably a selfish behaviour or an altruistic behaviour? The motivations 
behind punishment are still an enigma. Based on public goods interactions, we present a 
model in which just a certain portion of the public good is divided equally among all 
members. The other portion is distributed to contributors when paying a second cost. 
Contributors who are willing to pay a second cost can be costly (and then altruistic) 
punishers, but they can also flourish or dominate the population, in this case we may call 
them “advantageous punishers”. We argue that most of successful cooperators and 
punishers in nature are advantageous punishers, and costly punishment mostly happens in 
humans. This indicates a universal surviving rule: contributing more and gaining more. 
Our models show theoretically that the original motivation behind punishment is to 
retrieve deserved payoff from their own contributions, a selfish incentive.  
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1. Introduction 
The emergence and abundance of cooperation at various levels in nature poses a 
challenging and long-standing problem to many disciplines ranging from evolutionary 
biology to social sciences and economics (1-5). In human societies, costly (and then 
altruistic) punishment seems an effective mechanism to ensure cooperative behaviour in 
joint enterprises. People are willing to use altruistic punishment to varying degrees, 
voluntarily paying a cost to punish noncooperators (6-20). The altruistic punishers can 
emerge and come to dominate a population of contributors, defectors, and 
nonparticipants in voluntary public goods games (15-17). If every contributor is willing 
to pay a cost for punishment, the institutions that impose sanctions on defectors may be 
formed in the population, and in this case the cooperative behaviour is often enforced 
more efficiently and the second cost is frequently lower (13). However, in many 
situations altruistic punishment is costly, the winners don’t punish in the sense that 
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costly punishers do not gain the highest total payoff (18, 19). In view of this, whether 
the costly punishment behaviour emerges if participation is compulsory, whether the 
punishment behaviour is always costly and altruistic, and what motivates the 
punishment behaviour are still puzzling. Based on public goods interactions (21-23), 
representing the prisoner's dilemma of an arbitrary number of players, we present a 
model in which only a fraction of the public good created from the individual 
contributions is divided equally among all members. The other part is distributed to 
contributors when paying a second cost after contribution. The contributors who are 
willing to pay a second cost are called the persistent cooperators (PC), indicating their 
desire to retrieve the proportion of the payoff derived from their own contributions to 
the common enterprise with persistent efforts. The persistent cooperators enjoy and 
engage in the joint enterprise and from it they expect to gain a stable payoff that may 
not be achieved from one's activities alone. There are many examples that humans share 
the goods according to their labours. The activities include hunting, warfare, trade, food 
sharing, and almost all the collective actions that can generate common payoff. 
Different positions of employment match different levels of salaries, which lays a 
foundation for modern human societies. People live in highly diverse houses and 
possess different ranks of cars. In animal societies, for examples, the stronger lions who 
fight for food share the best meat of buffalo, and in some primates, the dominant animal 
that has the most powerful fighting ability possesses a lot of priorities (24).  
The persistent cooperation (PC) is a new strategy in our model. The persistent 
cooperators can behave as costly punishers (P) defined by previous models (7, 15-17). 
But the PCs can also fare better within a reasonable range of parameters. We may call 
the persistent cooperators in this case “advantageous punishers” for comparison, since 
they behave as punishers (pay another cost to reduce the payoff for defectors through 
increasing the payoff for themselves), and also they benefit. The inclusion relations for 
contributors, (pure) cooperators (C), persistent cooperators (PC), costly punishers and 
advantageous punishers are shown in Fig. 1. This study focuses on the evolutionary 
dynamics of a population in which there are three behavioural types: cooperators (C), 
persistent cooperators (PC) and defectors (D).    
2. Model and method  
Suppose that a large population including cooperators (C) and defectors (D) has an 
opportunity to create a public good in the joint enterprise, where cooperators invest into 
the common good while defectors do not contribute. Cooperators pay an individual cost 
c to increase the size of the public good by b (b c> ). The fraction q (0 1)q< < of the 
public good is divided equally among all members, the other part of it is distributed to 
contributors when paying a second cost. The second cost is in direct proportion to the 
fraction of defectors as the punishing cost in previous models (7, 15-17), because the 
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PC struggles to retrieve deserved payoff more hardly if there are many defectors in the 
system. The persistent cooperators (PC) are willing to pay the second cost and gain the 
returning payoff (1 )q b− , but the cooperators (C) who contribute but are not willing to 
pay a second cost can not obtain the returning payoff.  
    We first consider a simple situation where all the contributors are willing to pay a 
second cost. Denote the fraction of the persistent cooperators (PC) in the population by 
x, and the second cost by (1 )k x− , where 1 x− is the proportion of defectors and 0k > . 
Then the expected payoff is ( ) (1 ) (1 )q bx c q b k x− + − − −  
( ) [(1 ) ](1 )b c x q b c k x= − + − − − − for the persistent cooperators, ( )q bx for defectors, 
where ( )q bx  stands for the expected payoff for every individual derived from the 
proportion q of the public good and (1 )q b− the retrieved portion of payoff for each PC. 
From the two payoff expressions we can see that the game is equivalent to that with 
pairwise interactions whose payoff matrix is given by 
                               
     (1 )  
  
                 0
PC D
PC b c b q c k
D qb
− − − −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                                (1) 
The entries denote the payoff for the row player.  
Now we present the typical model in which there are contributors who would not pay 
a second cost for retrieving the proportion of the payoff. Here there are three behavioral 
types, cooperators (C), persistent cooperators (PC) and defectors (D). Suppose that the 
population of size N consists of Cn  cooperators, PCn  persistent cooperators and 
C PCN n n− −  defectors. The fractions of three strategies are denoted by x, y, and 
1 x y− − respectively with / , /C PCx n N y n N= = . The expected payoff for every 
individual derived from the proportion q of the public good is ( )qb x y+ . The other 
portion of total common goods is (1 ) ( )C PCq b n n− ⋅ + , of which the part  
(1 ) PCq b n− ⋅ derived from the contributions of persistent cooperators is distributed 
among themselves. Then from this part of payoff each of the persistent cooperators pays 
a second cost (1 )k x y− −  for the retrieved payoff (1 )q b− , but the cooperators do not. If 
the part (1 ) Cq b n− ⋅  of the public good from the contributions of the cooperators is 
divided equally among all members, the expected payoff for every individual is 
(1 )q bx− , which is given to each of defectors. We consider a more rigorous situation 
where the persistent cooperators have no intention to obtain the payoff (1 )q bx− per 
individual that should be returned to cooperators (in other situation every persistent 
cooperator receives an additional share (1 )q bx− and they will fare better). Then 
naturally each of cooperators gets the income (1 ) ( ) /C PC Cq bx n n n− + , that is, 
(1 ) ( )q b x y− + , from the part (1 ) Cq b n− ⋅  of the total public good derived from the 
contributions of the cooperators themselves. Thus the expected payoffs for cooperators, 
the persistent cooperators, and defectors are respectively:  
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( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ,CP qb x y c q b x y b x y c= + − + − + = + −  
( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) [(1 ) ](1 ),     (2)PCP qb x y c q b k x y b x y c q b k x y= + − + − − − − = + − + − − − −
( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) .DP qb x y q bx b x y q by= + + − = + − −  
Thus the equivalent game has the following payoff matrix among C, PC and D 
                                      
                
           (1 )
                           0
C PC D
C b c b c c
PC b c b c q b k c
D b qb
− − −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− − − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
                                             (3) 
The entries denote the payoff for the row player.  
3. Results  
If all the contributors are willing to pay a second cost, then there are only two kinds of 
players, the persistent cooperators (PC) and defectors (D) in the population. We 
designate the conditions for the evolution of cooperation in such a system. Let b cα = − , 
(1 )b q c kβ = − − − , qbγ = , and 0δ = in payoff matrix (1), and then we have the 
following results (5).  
1) PC is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), if α γ> , that is,  
1
1
b
c q
> − .  
2) PC is risk-dominant (RD), if α β γ δ+ > + . Then we have 
                                                    1 (1 )
1 2
b k
c q c
> +− .  
3) PC is advantageous (AD), indicating that cooperation has a fixation probability 
greater than the inverse of the population in finite populations, if 2 2α β γ δ+ > + . 
This induce  
                                             1 2(1 )
1 3
b k
c q c
> +− .  
4) The persistent cooperators dominate defectors, if  and α γ β δ> > , showing that 
                                              1 (1 )
1
b k
c q c
> +− .  
For cooperation to be beneficial, all conditions can be expressed as the benefit-to-cost 
ratio exceeding a critical value, which is inversely proportional to the parameter (1 q− ), 
and proportional to the ratio of the second cost for retrieving the deserved payoff to the 
contributing cost. Intuitively, if the proportion (1 q− ) of the payoff that returns to the 
contributors themselves is large, and the second cost is relatively smaller than the 
contributing cost, the critical value is small and then the cooperation is easier to prevail. 
We next consider the evolutionary dynamics in the typical population in which there 
are contributors who would not pay a second cost for retrieving the proportion of the 
payoff. All three behavioral types, cooperators (C), persistent cooperators (PC) and 
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defectors (D) are present in the system. From the payoff expressions (2) we can see that 
if the  second cost is high, that is, (1 )k q b> − , the PCs behave as the traditional 
punishers (P)  who cooperate and then punish each defector in the population, reducing 
each defector’s payoff by /p N  at a cost 1 /k N  to the punisher, where (1 )p q b= −  and 
1 (1 )k k q b= − −  (7). In this case the persistent cooperation should be an altruistic act, 
given that individuals who contribute but do not pay a second cost are better off than the 
persistent cooperators. As altruistic punishers, the fate of PCs has been revealed by 
previous models. For example, in virtue of models of group selection altruistic 
punishment is evolutionarily stable when it is common (7, 10). Altruistic punishment 
can evolve in an individual selection context under the mechanism of voluntary 
participation, but in a single isolated population it can not emerge (7, 15-17). However, 
when the second cost is not high, satisfying (1 )k q b< − , the persistent cooperators fare 
better than the pure cooperators. In this case the persistent cooperators are advantageous 
punishers. The magnitude of retrieved payoff (1 )q b−  comparative to a linear 
combination of the cooperating cost c and the second cost k decides the population 
dynamics. It is reasonable to assume that the cost for cooperating c is larger than the 
cost for retrieved payoff k ( c k> ). Then the retrieved payoff (1 )q b− is larger than the 
second cost k ( (1 )q b k− > ) does not mean it is larger than the cooperating cost c 
( (1 )q b c− > ). But the latter is least condition for cooperation to propagate in a single 
population without option to abstain from the joint endeavour, just as the elementary 
condition for the collective activity to be profitable in a model with costly punishment 
under the mechanism of voluntary participation that the fine of punishment must be 
larger than the cost of contributing to the public good ( p c> ) (16).  
Traditionally, evolutionary game dynamics is described for a single, infinite 
population. In this case, the standard model of evolutionary selection dynamics is the 
replicator equations (21, 25, 26). Under replicator dynamics, every strategy that 
performs better than the population on average increases in abundance ( )i i ix x π π= −& , 
where ix  is the fraction of type i in the population, iπ  is the fitness of this type and 
i ii
xπ π=∑  is the average payoff in the whole population. Replicator equations 
describe a deterministic selection process. When the population is finite, the 
evolutionary game dynamics is often described as an explicit stochastic process which 
can tackle internal noise arising from the finiteness of the population (27, 28). The 
stochastic evolutionary dynamics in a finite population is frequently explored under a 
certain level of selection and mutation (15, 29, 30).  
We next specify how strategies diffuse within the population depending on some 
simple rules that form different ranges of parameters.  
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(1) If (1 )
2
kc q b c< − < + , then from the payoff matrix (3) we have that both D and PC 
are Nash equilibria, but defection is the only one of these three strategies that is an 
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). In this case cooperation is not advantaged.  
(2) If 2(1 )
2 3
k kc q b c+ < − < + , also, both D and PC are Nash equilibria, and defection 
is the only strategy that is evolutionarily stable under deterministic selection. However, 
for stochastic evolutionary dynamics in populations of large but finite size N, the PC 
strategy will be favoured in the sense that its abundance (average frequency) exceeds 
1/3, the equilibrium abundance of each strategy in the absence of selection, since 
3
22 2 2
1
1 2( ) (1 ) 0
3 3 2PC i i iii
kL a a a a q b c
=
⎡ ⎤= + − − = − − − >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ . 
The conclusion is reached for low mutation probabilityμ ( 1/ )Nμ    (29). Interestingly, 
this range of parameters is the same as that in which persistent cooperators are risk-
dominant (RD) in a two-strategy population with only PC and D.  
(3) If 2 (1 )
3
kc q b c k+ < − < + , besides 0PCL > , we also have   
                   
3 3
22
1 1
1 1 2( ) (1 ) 0
3 3 3PC j iji j
kH a a q b c
= =
⎡ ⎤= − = − − − >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑∑ . 
Selection favours the PC strategy for arbitrary mutation probability (29). Likewise 
interestingly, in this range the persistent cooperators are advantageous (AD) in a 
population of only PC and D. Computer simulations show that the frequency of the 
persistent cooperators always rises from a smaller value at the beginning, and keeps 
more than 1/3 most of the time (Fig. 2).  
(4) If (1 )q b c k− > + , then PC dominates D in a population of only PC and D. Thus 
under deterministic selection cooperators may invade an infinitely large population of 
persistent cooperators in the neutral case, defectors can invade the population of 
cooperators, and the persistent cooperators can invade the population of defectors. The 
system may exhibits a tendency to cycle (from cooperation to defection to PC and back 
to cooperation), as a result of a rock-paper-scissors mechanism. Cooperation can be 
favoured but may not be stabilized (Fig. 3). However, the stochastic evolutionary 
dynamics in a finite population can show a significant cooperating feature: the 
persistent cooperators dominate the population almost all the time. As in the models of 
volunteering and punishment in public goods games, for simplicity we consider the 
stochastic dynamics under small mutation rates and strong selection (28). This implies 
that the population is homogeneous most of the time, i.e. in states PC, C or D. An 
occasional mutant will have taken over the population or disappeared before the next 
mutation appears (15, 28, 30). Thus the dynamics is determined by a Markov chain 
based on the transition probabilities between three homogeneous states (the population 
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is composed exclusively of one type of three strategies). In the limit of strong selection, 
these transition probabilities can be easily derived: (i) in the cooperator state C, a single 
defector is advantageous and takes over the population with probability 1. The 
persistent cooperators can invade through neutral drift with probability 1/ N ; (ii) in the 
defector state D, a mutant cooperator is disadvantageous and disappears. The persistent 
cooperators are advantageous and take over with probability 1; (iii) in the PC state, 
defectors are disadvantageous. Cooperators obtain the same payoff as persistent 
cooperators and can take over through neutral drift with probability 1/ N .  This yields 
the transition matrix 
                                
                                       
1 1 1     0        
2 2 2
1 1                         0
2 2
1 1 1               1
2 2 2
C D PC
C
N N
D
PC N N
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The matrix only depends on the population size N. The stationary distribution is   
1 1 1( , , ) ( , , )
3 3 3C D PC
NP P P P
N N N
+= = + + + .  
Therefore, for large N, the system spends almost all the time in the PC state. The reason 
is that the transition leading away from the PC state is neutral and thus very slow 
compared to all other transitions. 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
Cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle both in human and animal societies. Costly 
punishment is considered an effective mechanism to ensure cooperation in public goods 
interactions. This raises a second-order social dilemma because non-punishing 
cooperators outperform those that do punish (15). Experimental evidence shows that 
costly punishment does not always increase cooperation, and the winners do not punish.  
Moreover, if punishers are rare, they suffer tremendous costs from punishing defectors 
who then undergo little disadvantage. 
Under the mechanism of voluntary participation the problem how costly punishment 
behaviour evolves can be solved (15-17). Besides cooperators, defectors and punishers, 
these models assume that there exist nonparticipants, the fourth kind of players in the 
system. The nonparticipants receive a fixed benefit from other activities and play a 
pivotal role for providing recurrent opportunities for punishers to emerge. However, the 
costly punishing behaviour can not evolve without any extra mechanism (7, 10, 15-17). 
Based on public goods interactions, we present a model in which a certain portion of 
the public good may return to contributors when paying a second cost. The persistent 
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cooperators who pay a second cost, become the traditional punishers if the second cost 
is high ( (1 )k q b> − ). In this case we mean that the costly punishers emerge in a single 
population. And the PCs are not willing, but compelled to become the costly punishers 
due to high second cost. In the real world, maybe only human beings can persist in such 
costly punishment behaviour. Humans have abilities to punish more heavily, and have 
wisdom to anticipate a stable payoff from the joint enterprise later by persistently 
imposing sanctions on defectors. Meanwhile the persistent punishing behaviour can 
benefit other peoples and then be considered an altruistic behaviour (7, 10, 15-17). 
However, this study has not focused on this situation.  
We stress the situation where the second cost is not high ( (1 )k q b< − ). In this case 
the persistent cooperators who are called the advantageous punishers, can flourish or 
dominate the population, which is just the reason why the contributors are willing to pay 
a second cost. The possible risk for paying a second cost is that the persistent 
cooperators may become costly punishers (when the second cost is high in the above 
mentioned situation). In many practical situations the contributors should pay a second 
cost to fight against exploitation of defectors and to retrieve deserved payoff from their 
own contributions, otherwise they can not obtain enough payoffs from cooperation for 
surviving (see the following example for a typical society of lions and hyenas). 
The suggested model in this study has clear biological and social basis. We argue that 
most of successful cooperators and punishers in the real world are the persistent 
cooperators and also the advantageous punishers who are not realized before. In this 
case the social dilemma does not exist, and then cooperation emerge everywhere in 
nature. In animal societies individuals punish other members that infringe their interests. 
In most cases, punishers benefit and cooperative behaviours are enforced because 
victims learn to avoid repeating damaging behaviour (24). These animal punishers are 
surely advantageous. In a typical society of lions and hyenas, lions pay a first cost to kill 
buffalos. However, they should pay a second cost to fight hyenas for keeping the meat 
from robbing (24, 32), and then they are persistent cooperators (PC). Usually the second 
cost is affordable (the number of lions is more than about one-third of the number of 
hyenas), the lions are advantageous punishers and win. Otherwise they may give up. 
In human societies, the persistent cooperators and advantageous punishers are also 
ubiquitous. For example, most of us work hard to increase social wealth (pay first cost 
to contribute). Our salaries (the proportion of the payoff derived from our own 
contributions) are usually the part of the public good generated by ourselves. When we 
receive the salaries we should simultaneously pay the tax or other fees (the second cost) 
for public interests or losses. To avoid disadvantage, in many case people usually select 
to make a warning instead of a fighting, to negotiate rather than to retaliate. We 
normally settle international affairs and disputes by political or diplomatic means 
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instead of a war. The United States can afford the costly Iraq War, but many of 
developing countries can not.  
To conclude, this model suggests the persistent cooperators (PC) who pay a personal 
cost to increase the size of the public good, and then pay a second cost for the return of 
partial payoff derived from their own contributions to the common enterprise. The 
persistent cooperators pursue both the investment and the return. The PCs can behave as 
traditional punishers suggested by previous models, which may account for the origin of 
human costly punishment behaviour in a population in which participation is 
compulsory. But they can be favoured within a reasonable range of parameters, in this 
case they are called advantageous punishers. The occurrence of most punishment 
behaviours in both animal and human societies is the case. Our model shows 
theoretically that the original motivation behind punishment behaviour is to retrieve 
deserved payoff derived from their own contributions, a selfish incentive. The model 
may also suggest that for most of individuals the major motivation behind punishment 
and cooperation at various levels is to gain a stable payoff that is maybe not the highest, 
but seems unattainable without joint efforts, which may account for the nature of life.  
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Figure 1 The inclusion relations for contributors, (pure) cooperators (C), persistent 
cooperators (PC), costly punishers and advantageous punishers. 
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Figure 2 Simulations of finite populations consisting of three types of players. The 
selection dynamics are formulated according to the frequency dependent Moran process 
with population size 100N = (Nowak et al. 2004; Traulsen & Hauert 2009). At each 
time step, an individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to its fitness if , 
where 1i if Pω ω= − + , iP is the payoff in Equation (2), ω  denotes the intensity of 
selection (here 0.2ω =  so that all 0if > ), and i=C, PC, and D. One identical offspring 
is being produced which replaces another randomly chosen individual, but subject to 
mutation, that is, with probability 0μ >  one of the other two strategies is chosen at 
random. Initially, the frequency of the persistent cooperators (PC) is set to be 0.2. But it 
quickly rises and keeps more than 1/3 most of the time. The simulation results represent 
the average frequencies of 50 simulations over 15,000 time periods. Parameter values 
are 3b = , 1/ 3q = , 1.1c =  and 1k =  ( (1 )q b c k− < + ). (A) The mutation probability is 
low ( 0.005 0.01 1/ Nμ = < = ). (B) The mutation probability is high 
( 0.05 0.01 1/ Nμ = > = ).  
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Figure 3 Replicator dynamics of three strategies depending on the payoff matrix (3) 
with b=3, q=1/3, c=1 and k=0.5 ( (1 ) 0.5 0q b c k− − − = >  ). Cooperators (C) are 
dominated by defectors (D), defectors by the persistent cooperators (PC), and 
cooperators (C) may invade the population of PC in the neutral case. There are no stable 
fixed points in the system. Although the system may exhibits a tendency to cycle, there 
is a significant region where the population tends toward PC (the figure is produced 
with Bill Sandholm's Dynamo package (Sandholm & Dokumaci 2007)). 
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